Germany and the Political Perils of the Pandemic
Image: nationsonline.org
In the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed like Europe had done an exemplary job of handling the virus. Infection rates were low, and the German soccer league was the first major sports league to resume competition in May 2020, which many, like myself, took as a sign that greener pastures would arrive before too long. Instead, after a summer reprieve, the world backed into a deadly winter that we’ve only just begun to emerge from.
In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel has spearheaded the German response to COVID-19 and as such, has been the recipient of the changing tides of public opinion. Last summer’s surge in popularity for Merkel’s party, the Christian Democratic Union, has since been replaced by a long ebb as the pandemic has dragged on. Germany has not avoided complications that some parliamentary democracies have been able to, due to the construction of the German government. Following World War II, the Western Allies mandated the creation of a democratic government in West Germany. The federalist structure of government in the now-unified Germany, however, offers the 16 German states, commonly referred to as Länder, direct influence in the upper house of the German legislature.
The power of the Länder has proven a thorn in Merkel’s side throughout the pandemic. In the United States, states have the power to set their own public health guidelines. Huge policy discrepancies have arisen as a result, as states like Texas have removed all restrictions while states such as California have hewed much closer to the guidance of public health experts. While no Länder have done anything as drastic as Texas, they also have the ability to set their own guidelines regarding COVID-19 restrictions. For instance, the Saarland, a state in western Germany neighboring France, has allowed its residents much more leeway than Berlin.
At times, this has set Merkel at odds with state premiers, each of whom has their own political agenda. Recent events have brought this conflict to a head. Shortly before Easter, Merkel unveiled a last minute plan for an “Easter rest,” a short lockdown beginning the Thursday before Easter and intended to prevent widespread mingling between households over the holiday. Just a day after the plan had been presented, however, Merkel found herself again at a lectern, this time apologizing to Germans. “I ask forgiveness from everyone in Germany,” she said, while also maintaining that Germany’s third wave of the virus needed urgent action to combat.
State minister-presidents felt that they had been insufficiently informed of the decision making process, and that the federal government consistently backed itself into a corner by waiting for the last minute to deliberate. But in recent weeks, Merkel has responded by going even bolder: introducing legislation that would take some power to handle the pandemic away from the states. Under the legislation, certain COVID-19 safety measures would be automatically instigated should infection rates hit a level of 100 new cases per 100,000 residents, with more restrictions to be imposed should cases climb even higher. The institution of these regulations would mark a new phase of Germany’s pandemic response, and their results could very well decide control over the government in September’s federal elections.
The legislation, which has yet to be introduced, is likely to be challenged in court. Were it to take effect at the time of writing, it would put much of Germany back into lockdown, as only one state has a positivity rate below the 100 per 100,000 residents threshold. Critics of the legislation believe that it assumes too much authority into the federal government, an understandable concern for a country with a dark history of strong central governments. Moreover, they feel that its basis on incidence rates is a poor approach and that it should also take into consideration ICU capacity. However, the defeat of the legislation would be short-sighted. No government has escaped harsh criticism from all sides for its handling of the pandemic, but a lesson of the last year is that decisive action on a nationwide scale is necessary to effectively combat the virus.
German rhetoric surrounding their third wave has grown increasingly pronounced in recent weeks, as on April 15 when the head of the German public health agency warned that decisive action needed to be taken, a sentiment that has since been reiterated by the German health minister. Much of the concern stems from the frequency of the B117 variant, which originated in Britain and is more contagious than the original strain of the virus. In a political sense, this pits state leaders, who want the leeway to act as they see fit, against those in Merkel’s government who want to take a firm hand on the country’s COVID-19 policy. A concern of critics is that the cession of some powers to the central government will be followed by more centralization in other areas. There is no reason that a middle ground cannot be broached, however. In the short run, the central government could assume specific public health powers to allow for a unified national management of the pandemic. Then, as the situation improves, whether this year or the next, those powers could likewise be devolved back onto the states. Furthermore, given the extraordinary crisis that we have lived through this past year, there is no reason it should necessarily be used as a precedent for similar assumptions of power.
In the background of all COVID-19 machinations looms September’s federal elections, which could well become a referendum on the coalition government’s handling of the pandemic. For the first time since 2005, Angela Merkel will not be standing for election, and her party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), recently decided that Armin Laschet, the leader of the larger party, will be their joint candidate for the chancellorship. Laschet, the recently elected leader of the CDU and minister-president of the most populous state in Germany, defeated Christian Söder of Bavaria, one of the most popular politicians in Germany, in a contentious power struggle that was widely considered to cast the conservatives in a bad light.
Meanwhile, the Green Party continues their surge towards possibly entering the ruling coalition this fall. Recent polling data shows the Greens polling nationwide at 22 percent, up 3 percent from just a month ago and cutting their deficit to the CDU/CSU to only 5 percent. The conservatives have been hemorrhaging support as of late and are now polling at 27 percent, down from 36 percent at the beginning of February. The collapse in support for the conservatives can be attributed in part to the terrible rollout of the European Union’s vaccination program. As of April 11, only 15 percent of Germans had received at least one dose of a vaccine, compared to 37 percent in the United States and 61 percent in the United Kingdom. Across the EU, vaccination rates have lagged significantly until recently, and Germany has recently begun considering purchasing doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine against prevailing EU policy. The vaccination situation will improve over the course of the summer, but by then it could be too late for the CDU/CSU to reap any political benefit.
The Greens generally support Merkel’s proposed “emergency brake” legislation, but, like all German parties right now, have issues with the specifics of the regulations. A knock against the Greens is that they don’t have experience in a ruling coalition, in which they haven’t participated since 2005. They are currently the smallest of six parliamentary delegations, but their environmentalism and position on the moderate center-left have bolstered their public support over the last couple of years. By signaling their support for stronger central control over the pandemic response, they express that they feel confident in their ability to hold those reins themselves. Should the Greens ultimately enter government, they would offer Germany the opportunity to start a new chapter after the Merkel years. While Germany’s conservatives are relatively centrist in comparison to other Western conservative parties, a transition of power to the left would be a welcome reinvigoration of German politics, both domestically and in Europe. Merkel’s rule has at times been stultifying, and though she has been an exceedingly competent and steady hand at the tiller, new blood could push Germany to begin further exerting itself outside of its dominant role in Europe.
COVID-19 has shown again and again that there are no easy solutions. Especially in an election year, the political risks that come with pandemic management proposals are particularly acute. Germany is ready for a more centralized response, however. German society has undergone a societal transformation since the end of World War II, and fears that increased centralization could lead to an authoritarian redux are grounded in a different era. If Merkel is able to get a handle on the pandemic this summer, the CDU/CSU effort to retain the chancellorship would be greatly bolstered. However, should the vaccination effort encounter more difficulty, or the third wave of the virus be ineffectively handled, they could suffer come September, likely to the political delight of the Greens. Many possibilities remain for the remainder of this year, but some become increasingly likely every day. Like everything regarding this pandemic, we will just have to wait and see.