Failures of the South Korean Model
The commercial success of the recent South Korean film, Parasite has imbued many South Koreans with a sense of national pride. Parasite became *the first non-English film to win the Academy Award for ‘Best Picture’ in 2020. *The film depicts the impoverished Kim family infiltrating the wealthy Park household as domestic workers in a bid for social mobility. The unconventional comedic-thriller highlighted the growing social and economic disparities in South Korean society.
The endurance of Confucianism as the foundation for Korean society is largely to blame for these disparities. Confucianism is a philosophical school of thought central to the social underpinnings of many East Asian countries. It has a heavy emphasis on loyalty within a social pyramid and deference to authority. This is embodied in a virtue known as filial piety, where children are expected to care for their parents because elders are higher up in the established social hierarchy. The idea is extended to the rest of society, supporting a ruler at the top with aristocrats directly below. They were followed by workers and other lower echelons of society. This structure provided a foundation for the development of nations across East Asia. Confucianism, therefore, has had extensive influence over the historical governmental and social systems of South Korea.
The rebuilding of South Korea began under a system of guided capitalism, with business conglomerates called chaebols being given preferential economic support. This has lasted until today. The conglomerates dominate large sectors of the economy, with the top ten chaebols controlling more than 27% of all business assets in the country. Chaebols have contributed to the stifling of small businesses and startups. The market dominance of chaebols thereby limits the supply of well-paying jobs to be from government positions and conglomerates.
The lack of economic opportunity has led South Korean household debt to balloon to 184% of net disposable income, the 8th highest in the OECD or Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The emphasis of Confucianism on an adherence to authority and rigid social structure upholds this predatory system. Business elites have become intertwined with the political ruling class, allowing the continued existence of these bloated conglomerates.
The government’s attachment to Confucianism is also a major driver in rising poverty rates among the elderly. Poverty rates for the age bracket of 66 years or older is at 43.8% in South Korea. This is higher than any other OECD country, and 8.1% higher than the second highest country. There is an unusual lack of welfare programs in the country. South Korea ranked third to last among OECD countries on social spending at 11.1% of total GDP. The nation also ranked fourth to last among OECD countries for pension spending, at 3% of total GDP being spent. These statistics are largely a result of the enduring governmental reliance on Confucianism. Under this social system, it is assumed that children would repay their parents, thereby absolving any need for significant social programs. In the past, this meant that children would provide financially for their parents in return for the decades spent raising them. This is not the case in South Korea today, as children are less likely to adhere to filial piety. While the government continues to believe in and enact policies under a Confucian system, it fails to recognize the decline of those traditional values in the younger generations.
The South Korean government must address the issue of widening economic and social disparity soon. As the peninsula becomes more modernized and Confucian social contracts breakdown, the government needs to revise its approach in tackling social welfare in order to ensure a better future for South Korea. Chaebols have too much political and economic sway, hindering attempts to break them up. The existence of such influential conglomerates will only continue to repress economic efficiency. The reliance on outmoded Confucian ideals in place of concrete social programs fails in the face of a modern secular generation of South Koreans.