Russia’s Return to the Middle East: A Neo-Cold War Dynamic
Illustration: Kai Sase Ebens for Davis Political Review.
The Kremlin dramatically initiated its re-entrance to the Middle East with Russia’s 2015 intervention in the Syrian Civil War to save the dwindling authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Today, an estimated 5,000 Russian troops are operating in Syria. Russia continues to supply the Syrian dictator with arms and airstrikes directed against rebel forces fighting Assad. These airstrikes have wantonly targeted Syrian civilians and alerted human rights organizations — the civilian death toll in Syria since March 2011 is 226,779, with at least 8,427 of them killed directly by Russian forces. This was Russia’s first operation in the Middle East since the end of the Cold War in 1991, repositioning itself as an actor in the region. In 2020, Moscow has intensified its pursuit of power and a neo-Cold War dynamic may be emerging in the Middle East.
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for influence in the Middle East; since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.’s influence in the region has prevailed. Today, however, America’s presence in the Middle East is starting to wane and, in response, Moscow has begun exploiting this power void.
These changing power dynamics pose new opportunities for Middle Eastern states. Arab leaders understand that they may benefit more now from cultivating ties with both the United States and Russia than they would have in the past. In an era of renewed global power struggles, Middle Eastern instability is susceptible to Russian influence, similar to its susceptibilities during the Cold War. It is important to remember that the dominant power’s intentions in the region are essential in determining their responses to concerns like Islamist terrorism and humanitarian crises. A Russian hegemon in the region is likely to buttress Arab states’ oppressive authoritarian leadership and jeopardize the free-flow Middle Eastern oil, on which the world relies. As such, these shifting power dynamics are a national security concern and threaten U.S. interests in the region.
The 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria was a pivotal shift in Moscow’s Middle East policy. The rise of ISIS in Syria presented an opportunity for the Kremlin to wrap their intervention in anti-terror rhetoric and thereby ensure domestic support. The Obama administration’s reluctance to get involved in the Syrian conflict — to avoid an ‘Iraq repeat’ — reassured Moscow that they would face no direct clash with the U.S. Largely absent from the Middle East for the previous two decades, Russia intervened to save Assad’s autocratic regime and reasserted itself as a major player in the region’s power politics.
Unlike in Soviet times, Russia’s engagement in the Middle East today is non-ideological and pragmatic. Contrary to America’s commitment to democracy, Russia is less entrenched in its historical communist values and able to consult with all sides of the region’s conflicts. It has close ties to Iran and the major Sunni states (which include the Gulf countries, Egypt, Turkey, and Syria) — currently, the Kremlin is developing a relationship with major U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. While such nascent ties are primarily economic, they have the potential to evolve into larger intelligence and military partnerships.
Russian Intentions in the Middle East and Regional Implications
Russia’s goals in the Middle East can be divided into three categories: security interests, economic advancement, and global prestige (especially concerning Russia’s rivalry with the U.S.).
Russia shares one primary interest with the U.S.: countering terrorism in the Middle East. Although to differing degrees, both nations have pursued the elimination of ISIS in Syria. Preserving stability in the region will lower the risk of spillover into Russia and its neighbors. However, Moscow’s interest in counter-terrorism may not be completely straightforward. Putin may not want radical Islamic terrorism to be entirely eliminated because the threat of terrorist activity assists him in maintaining legitimacy for intervention in Syria.
In the future, Russia may not be interested in having a democratic Syria because of the Kremlin’s operations in the country in the past years — mass displacement and killing, destruction of hospitals, besieging communities, and other heinous abuses of power. These abuses have not earned Russia much support among Syrians and, as a result, a truly democratic system would threaten Russian influence in the country. It seems as though the establishment in Russia genuinely believes in the autocratic model. Therefore, with regard to security, Putin’s goals in Syria are to support the authoritarian Assad regime and eliminate Assad’s competitors.
Russia also has economic interests in the Middle East. The Gulf nations are major exporters of oil and gas, which are vital to Russia’s economy, political stability, and military finances. Arms trading is another major motivation for Russian intervention in the Middle East. In 2016, multiple countries in the region purchased a total of $21.4 billion worth of weapons from Russia. The Middle East is a fertile region for Moscow to showcase its weaponry (exemplified in Syria) and as an area to which it can sell these arms. Generally, Moscow hopes to expand economic ties with the region through arms sales, nuclear technology, and energy price manipulation — via coordination with the leading oil producers in the Gulf.
Concerning global prestige, the autocratic Russian Federation’s intentions are likely of a competitive nature with America’s democratic presence in the Middle East. Russia’s return to the Middle East has been facilitated in large measure by the perception that the U.S. is disengaging from the region. Russia’s intervention and reinstitution of a military footprint in the Middle East were also intended to prevent the advancement of U.S. interests. Putin desires to show the world that the United States does not have impunity in the region. Intervening in Syria was the Kremlin's first step in diminishing the U.S. as a world power; Putin’s next step is to pursue alliances throughout the Middle East. Russia is positioning itself not as the dominant player, but as one that will have the ability to challenge other countries that aspire to become dominant in the region. In essence, the strategic goal of Russian foreign policy in the Middle East is determined by Russia’s strategic objectives with respect to the United States.
Russia takes an opportunistic approach to undermining U.S. influence in the Middle East by seeking low-cost ways to demonstrate its dependability and flexibility. Many of the opportunities taken by Russia have emerged from the U.S.’s principle-based decisions. For example, the U.S. decided to withhold arms sales to both Egypt and Bahrain because both of the states’ regimes were committing human rights abuses. Russia seized this opportunity by selling arms to both Arab states in place of the U.S. In doing so, Moscow proved that they are an unconditional arms provider, willing to work with regimes despite their human rights violation. This was intended to stand in contrast to American values and demonstrate that the Kremlin would exploit any opportunity or vacuum that the U.S. left.
Most of the United States’ national security community does not consider Russia to be a great power. As such, Moscow’s principal aspiration is for the United States to recognize Russia as an equal and to reach an agreement in which Russia is given a significant position in the international community, along with the United States. This sort of competition harkens back to the Cold War’s dichotomic dynamic of U.S.-Soviet competition.
If given the opportunity to take full control of the Middle East, Russia may be reluctant. In comparison to America’s leadership in the region, Putin's toolkit — military, economic, and diplomatic — for projecting and sustaining its prospective dominance and influence in the region is limited. Aside from Syria, the Kremlin’s unwillingness and inability to commit capital to the region’s ailments have restrained Russian diplomacy in the Middle East. Therefore, the Kremlin can do little to address the region’s urgent economic, security, or societal challenges. Nevertheless, in the years to come, Putin will likely continue to employ a pragmatic and opportunistic approach to subverting U.S. interests and establishing a greater military and economic influence in the Middle East.
U.S. Interests in the Middle East and Arab Disillusionment
With America’s attempts to address these regional challenges, U.S. core interests in the Middle East can be distilled into the categories of national security and economic security. In terms of national security, the principal concerns are in preventing terrorist attacks on the United States, barring Iran from procuring nuclear weapons, and preserving the State of Israel’s security. Economically, Washington has an interest in ensuring an uninhibited flow of oil from the Middle East — as long as it remains an important factor in the health of the global economy. While the U.S. has been successful in initiatives such as countering ISIS and preserving Israel’s qualitative military edge, recent U.S. actions have troubled Arab leaders and created openings that Moscow can exploit.
Most recently, the American pullout of Syria, difficulties in containing Iran’s nuclear developments, and response to the September 2019 attack on Abqaiq, have accentuated Arab leaders’ doubt and exacerbated issues facing U.S.-Arab relations. When President Trump pulled American troops out of Syria in 2019, he abandoned the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces who had executed the U.S. campaign to defeat the self-proclaimed Islamic State — this portrayed the U.S. as an undependable partner. Fearful of Iran’s regional ambitions, sponsorship of terrorism, and nuclear development, Arab leaders looked to the United States to help contain Iranian recklessness. Despite U.S. sanctions on Iran, Tehran has further entrenched its autocratic dominion. Last, Washington’s ineffectual response to the September 2019 attack on Abqaiq, a critical Saudi oil installation, suggested that the United States may be reluctant to stand by its Arab allies.
In addition to Arab leaders’ skepticism of U.S. reliability, their citizenry is ambivalent, if not antagonistic, toward Washington. Most Arabs are disenchanted with the fidelity and aptitude of the United States’ initiatives abroad. Despite the U.S.’ leading role in weakening ISIS, a 2017 poll by the Arab-American Institute found that respondents in only two of seven surveyed Arab countries considered the U.S. role in Iraq and Syria to be positive. According to a 2017 Pew Research poll, 35 percent of Egyptian and Saudi respondents (two close U.S. partners) viewed Russia positively, while only 27 percent viewed the United States positively.
The Possibility of Arab States’ Alignment with Russia and Consequences
Recent U.S. actions have troubled Arab rulers and created openings that Moscow can exploit. Arab leaders acknowledge that they have limited control of U.S. policy, but they may be starting to perceive Washington as an unreliable ally. Given Russia’s proven ability to work with Iran in Syria, Arab leaders may see the Kremlin as the intermediary with Iran that Washington is not. While Arab rulers are far from abandoning their alliances with Washington, U.S.-Arab tensions are mounting. Anything from a rejuvenated Arab uprising, to a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, to an exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or to an Islamist terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland could cripple U.S.-Arab relations and present new opportunities for Moscow.
During the Cold War, there existed a major divide between Arab states — revisionist Arab states siding with the Soviet Union and conservative states siding with the U.S. Now that divide has been superseded by another debate: to what extent are pragmatic goals achieved by cooperation with the big powers in the world. For instance, many Gulf states feel that the U.S., exemplified by the liberation of Kuwait, is a reliable guarantor of Gulf security. Conversely, Arab states, like Egypt, are diversifying their alliance systems to avoid relying solely on one global power; they view Russia as an area of economic promise in ventures like tourism, arms sales, and education. Moreover, a number of the United States’ Arab partners are developing cooperative arrangements with Russia on specific issues. For instance, multilateral groupings like the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum are attracting a growing number of Arab ministers.
These changing dynamics may have substantial implications for the Middle East and the world economy. While Russian influence in the region is not strong yet, Russia will likely approach the region parsimoniously if it supersedes the U.S.’s leadership in the Middle East. Dictated by Putin, Russia is an authoritarian regime and condemns western democratic principles. A Russian hegemon in the Middle East may fortify authoritarian governments such as Iran, rather than promote democratic ideals as the U.S has. Regarding the economy, one of the U.S.’s closest allies, Saudi Arabia, has established twenty agreements with Russia in a Saudi-Russian Energy Partnership. This cooperation in world oil markets may limit output in the future. Energy agreements that affect the world economy in this way will likely become more common if Russia increases power in the region.
While this power shift of alliances in the Middle East may be gradual, Russia is likely to become a major contender in the region, igniting a neo-Cold War dynamic based on pragmatism. Since the Second World War, America’s positive image among Arabs has eroded. Though, with an adjusted approach to the Middle East, the U.S. can combat the Kremlin’s pursuit of power and reacquire its respected status in the region.
Implications for U.S. Interests and Policy Recommendations
Russia’s rising presence in the Middle East is a national security concern and threatens U.S. interests in the region. A realignment toward Russia could cost the United States its ability to ensure free-flowing oil, to access the region quickly for military operations, and to partner effectively with regional actors in advancing critical interests — such as combating terrorism, restraining Iran, and promoting regional stability.
Following Joe Biden’s projected U.S. presidential election win, Putin is still withholding his congratulatory remarks until “the results are confirmed in a legitimate, legal way.” Personal chemistry is crucial when interacting with authoritarian leaders and Putin’s hesitation to congratulate Biden may be suggestive of the tensions that are to come. Biden is expected to adopt a more assertive stance toward Russia; given their lack of chemistry, a U.S.-Russia agreement will be harder to reach and Putin is unlikely to cede his initiatives in the Middle East.
In order for Washington to maintain its relationships with Arab states and its pursuit of prosperity in the Middle East, it should strive to be a predictable partner. U.S. policy should deviate from previous commitments only when the circumstances are unequivocally justified. Arab leaders must be able to clearly understand the conditions upon which they can rely on U.S. support. Given the volatility of the Middle East, the reliability of U.S. foreign policy is vital for cultivating strong regional alliances. When feasible, consultation with allies should precede U.S. policy reforms, explaining the intention of the shift and the degree to which Washington’s position will vary. To effectively combat the reemergence of Russia in the Middle East, U.S. policy should not abandon priorities or values, but merely maintain consistency in balancing them.