A Diplomatic Strategy to Revamp the Iran Nuclear Deal
Illustration by Kai Sase Ebens for Davis Political Review
The Islamic Republic of Iran has always been a powerful player in Middle East politics and United States foreign policy interests. Going into 2021, Iran remains a top priority for U.S. policymakers including President Joe Biden. Iran continues to play a significant role in radicalizing Muslims and exacerbating the Sunni-Shia schism throughout the region; its growing strength poses a security threat to Israel and the Gulf states, America's most prominent allies in the Middle East. The most pressing issue for U.S. regional and national security interests has been Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities. Upon Biden’s inauguration today, Iran’s recent bellicose behavior will press him to establish a strategy for working with Tehran that safeguards U.S. national security and satisfies American allies in the Middle East.
U.S.-Iran Relations Under the Trump Administration
Although U.S.-Iran relations have been harsh since the 1979 revolution, the two nations have been at loggerheads since 2018 when President Trump pulled out of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a landmark Iran nuclear deal that was signed by the Obama Administration in 2015. Under Trump’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign against Iran, he imposed sweeping sanctions on the country, effectively strangling Iran’s economy. In 2020, the Trump administration continued to undermine Iranian hegemony in the Middle East by assassinating Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, brokering the Abraham Accords peace deal between Israel and many Gulf and North African states, and increasing sanctions against Iran. Recently, before his account was banned on Twitter, President Trump retweeted news of the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the architect of Iran’s nuclear-weapons program; the killing seems to have been the work of Israel. While Trump has put pressure on Iran, foreign policy experts have criticized him for escalating conflicts in the region without making a sufficient diplomatic effort first. In contrast, Biden's proposed approach to Iran centers on statecraft over sanctions and targeted killings. Notably, Biden has pledged to rejoin the JCPOA if Iran returns to compliance and generally aims to deal with Iran through diplomacy.
The Trump Administration’s tenure has lacked diplomacy, and Biden’s proposed diplomatic approach will certainly reverse this four-year unilateral approach. Trump’s policy of “Maximum Pressure” has suffocated Iran by isolating it from the world economy and effectively catalyzing a deep recession in the country. The economic hardship faced by Iranians triggered widespread protests in November 2019 that were brutally quashed by Iranian authorities. While the sanctions were effective in placing “Maximum Pressure,” the Trump administration never seriously sought a new deal. Meanwhile, Iran’s nuclear capabilities are greater than they were at the start of Trump’s term, with Iran enriching uranium to 20% past the limits established by the JCPOA. Nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian regime will have severe repercussions for U.S. security and the security of U.S. allies. Aside from the danger of a nuclearly-armed Iran, Iran would also be able to bestow nuclear technology or know-how upon its sponsored terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. This dramatic power shift would imperil the U.S. and the greater Middle East. Although covert operations and assassinations may set Iran’s nuclear program back, U.S. diplomatic initiatives hold out the promise of a more lasting solution.
How Circumstances Have Changed
Before Biden rushes back into the JCPOA, however, it is important to understand how circumstances have changed since it was signed in 2015. Interstate power dynamics in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula have evolved. Increasing concerns over Iran’s regional expansion and encroachment have brought Israel and the Gulf states together. The extent of this development is evident with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalizing relations with Israel — normalization may also be in the works with Saudi Arabia. As Tehran expands its nuclear activity, the anti-Iran axis within the Middle East is growing bolder and more brazen.
Also since 2015, internal Iranian politics have yielded a more staunch and conservative administration in Tehran. While elections in Iran are not free nor fair, legislators and their stances do still change to a limited degree. The failure of the nuclear deal to bring economic benefits has discredited Iran's pragmatists that Barack Obama’s team dealt with five years ago; they were shown to be more logical and less opposed to agreeing with the U.S. Iranian hardliners won parliamentary elections in 2020 and one such hardliner may win the presidential election in June 2021. Moreover, following the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the parliament approved plans to stray further from the nuclear deal and stop international inspections. These shifts will complicate Biden’s effort to turn back the clock by reentering the 2015 nuclear deal.
Due to mounting sanctions imposed by President Trump, the U.S.’s position has changed to demand more from a nuclear deal with Tehran. Iran’s GDP fell by 5.4% in 2018 and 6.5% in 2019, and it will likely fall again this year. The value of the Iranian rial has collapsed with inflation rates around 45%. Although the ruling elites have found ways to circumvent the sanctions, ordinary Iranian citizens are catching the brunt of the economic strife. While protesters in Iran are ruthlessly silenced by their Supreme Leader Khamenei’s regime, the conservative clerical elites are becoming more nervous and more likely to comply with a proposed nuclear plan from Biden.
These sanctions coupled with a stronger regional anti-Iran alignment have decreased Iran’s resolve and made the Islamic republic desperate to reach a settlement that provides economic relief. Hollow threats of retaliation by Iran have met the Trump administration’s relentless sanctions, assassinations of Iranian leaders, and condemning rhetoric. While the increase in Iran’s enriched uranium stores should not be taken lightly, they are not equivalent in effect to the initiatives Trump has pursued to undermine Iran’s hegemonic efforts. Nevertheless, it would be unwise for Biden to pursue a more aggressive military approach. Tehran has likely demonstrated restraint because they prefer a bargained, sanction-reliving agreement over further escalation. This was tacitly suggested when the Iranian foreign minister stated, “[The U.S.] has to show its good faith ... then Iran will go back in full compliance with JCPOA.”
JCOPA Revamp Strategy
The Trump administration has bequeathed Biden an extensive sanctions regime that he can leverage. If Biden were to quickly re-enter the nuclear deal, it would mean lifting the sharpest sanctions and ceding much of his bargaining leverage. This decision would be a mistake. In order to re-establish trust with America’s Middle Eastern allies, he must negotiate competently, not acquiesce. Biden should utilize his leverage by re-entering and extending the original accord as well as expanding the agreement to encompass some of the encroachment issues facing American allies in the region.
Biden’s first priority should be to extend the agreement in duration, which is set to expire over the next decade. While the Iranians are less keen to discuss missiles, for it is their principal means of deterrence, Biden should insist that Tehran reduce long-range missile launches and the supply of short-range missiles to their regional proxies. In return, for instance, he could further ease Iran’s economic strife by giving the country access to dollars and more civilian nuclear cooperation.
The effect of establishing a nuclear deal limiting Iran’s proxy fuel is likely to have beneficial implications for the greater Middle East. In 2015, American allies Israel and Saudia Arabia opposed the JCPOA arguing that it ignored funds and arms being supplied to Iran’s proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen. With the knowledge that Biden plans to re-enter the same agreement, both allies are now strongly opposed to it. If Biden were to expand the JCPOA in a way that limits Tehran’s transfer of missiles to its regional proxies, Israel and Saudia Arabia would be more supportive of the accord and major conflicts may subside. For example, with an adjusted JCPOA, the internationalized tensions of the Yemeni Civil War may decrease with Saudi Arabia facing less pressure from the Houthis. This sort of effect will likely be realized in other Iranian-entrenched conflicts like Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria as well.
Upon his inauguration today, Biden will have the opportunity to defend national security using the instrument of leverage in his diplomatic toolbox. Biden is in a position to negotiate a broader, longer-lasting deal with Iran. He should take advantage of this by attempting to hinder the security threat Iran poses to U.S. allies in the region with a revamped JCPOA.