The diplomatic talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia on April 20, 2021 may signify the beginning of a much-needed era of peace and security in the Middle East. Starting with Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979, the Persian Gulf region’s major powers — Iran and Saudi Arabia — have been engaged in a hegemonic battle for power and influence. These two nations are the most pivotal players in the Middle East and the proxy rivalry between them has cost the stability and citizens of the region profoundly — notably, in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Mediated by the Iraqi government in Baghdad, the tension-reducing talks may ultimately result in a détente that will reverse some of the havoc the Saudi-Iran conflict has produced in the past 42 years. While it is too early to be optimistic, the most optimal implications of détente will be decreased sectarian tensions and the prevalence of Middle Eastern extremism that harm US interests.

The April 20 talks included the Saudi intelligence chief and a senior Iranian security official, who secretly discussed several areas of contention, including the war in Yemen and Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Initially, neither of the two governments openly acknowledged the talks, which was an encouraging indication both sides were taking the discussion seriously and wanted to minimize the risk of foreign or domestic spoilers. To reaffirm the two parties’ seriousness, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “With negotiations and a constructive outlook, the two important countries in the region and the Islamic world can put their differences behind them and enter a new phase of cooperation and tolerance to bring stability and peace to the region.” While the actual content of talks remains vague, the mere occurrence of a face-to-face discussion between the two regional rivals is encouraging and follow-up meetings are said to be occurring soon. 

The talks in Baghdad come in the immediate context of reported progress between the US and Iran in restoring full compliance with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which restricts the Iranian nuclear program. Traditionally, Saudi Arabia (in addition to Israel) has been an opponent of JCPOA provisions that enable Iran to gradually build its nuclear capacity, maintain ballistic missile stocks, and increase its funding to Iranian proxies that threaten Saudi national security — namely, the Houthis across the Saudi Arabian southern border in Yemen. If Riyad still opposed a return to the JCPOA, it would likely take an approach similar to that of Israel which has executed small-scale attacks on Iranian facilities or, at the very least, demonstrate disapproval diplomatically. Instead, the voluntary and direct Saudi-Iran talks suggest Saudi Arabia’s approbation to the JCPOA. It also demonstrates that Riyadh plans to take a more long-term and sustainable approach to resolving the multitude of immediate threats emanating from Yemen and fostering greater peace in the region. 

The broader backdrop to these Baghdad talks features a wider reshuffling of relations in the Middle East as the region adjusts to changes in style and foreign policy from President Trump to President Biden. These policy changes have been dramatic, to say the least. On February 4, 2021, Washington stated that it is ceasing its support for the Saudi military campaign against the Houthis who have terrorized Yemenis and Saudis for over five years. Two weeks later, on February 16, the State Department revoked the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the Houthis. Then, after ten days, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report that verified the Saudi regime’s responsibility for the horrific 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Turkey. Generally, this shift in American support likely served as a wake-up call for Riyadh to take military and diplomatic matters into its own hands, making Saudi Arabia more amenable to regional diplomacy, even with its Persian rivals. 

The Kenyan proverb, ‘When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers,’ is most applicable to the Middle East, given the region’s perpetual internal and external exploitation. Therefore, if the Saudi-Iran talks between two ‘elephants’ continue on a pace towards a détente, the consequences for the Middle East will be comprehensively positive, and most radical for the region’s citizens, or ‘the grass.’ The Iran-Saudi conflict has been costly for both states and stoked instability in a vast region stretching from Afghanistan to Syria and Lebanon. At the moment, the two oil-dependent rentier states engage in explicit proxy warfare that fuels the conflicts in the Syrian Civil War, Yemeni Civil War, and Iraq. While fighters from Shiite–majority countries such as Iraq and Lebanon compose Iran’s primary proxies, militias in Sunni-majority states like Afghanistan, Syria, and the Palestinian territories have also come under Iran’s ‘proxy wing.’ This indirect warfare comes in addition to a multitude of other competitive arenas such as regional and religious hegemony, oil prices, and attitudes towards the US military presence in the Gulf. It is important to note that many of these conflicts also have internal catalysts and other interstate rivalries that affect them. It is thus doubtful that a triumphant Saudi-Iran dialogue will, single-handedly, quickly settle the current conflicts. Nevertheless, détente is highly likely to reduce their intensity and improve the prospects of resolution.

The cross-Gulf rapprochement is in the interests of most the states with a stake in the region, including the two main protagonists and the US. Iran has had a stronger and more consistent desire for better cross-Gulf relations. In contrast, Riyad has substantial incentives to maintain a confrontational posture toward Iran — such as preserving its favorable treatment from the US and the benefits of its diversionary foreign policy that increases support for the domestic regime. Though, in recent years, the Yemeni conflict has become a costly quagmire for Saudi Arabia’s  economy and stability. With the inauguration of Joe Biden in Washington, the United States has sought reconciliations with Iran and is acting on the Saudi regime’s objectionable practices. Saudi leadership, therefore, has sufficient reasons to reconsider this strategy. 

The US is almost certain to enjoy long-term and multifaceted benefits from a continued Saudi-Iran dialogue that should bring peace and security to conflicts that ail US interests. In the short term, the relaxation of tensions between the two rivals will better the possibility of success in post-JCPOA negotiations addressing other issues with Iran. Concerning regional threats, anything that lowers tension and the risk of war in the Middle East will also lower the incidence of extremism that endangers the US homeland. Subsequently, this will decrease the perceived need for US military deployments or other costly commitments intended to protect regional allies — thus facilitating America’s foreign policy pivot towards Asia and great power competition. 

The right-wing government of Israel, meanwhile, is likely to be a staunch opponent of a Saudi-Iran détente. For decades, Israel has exploited the Iran threat to promote its relations with the Gulf states, with recent successes; it now has diplomatic relations with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates via the Abraham Accords. Generally, the current Israeli government led by Benjamin Netanyahu has other reasons to promote everlasting alarm about Iran: Israel is preserving its position as America’s most dependable ally in the Middle East by precluding a US-Iranian agreement, weakening and isolating Iran for regional influence, and distracting international attention from the occupation of Palestinian territory. Moreover, less hostile Saudi-Iran ties may lose one of Israel’s bargaining chips in trying to cement its relations with the Gulf states. 

While Riyadh and Tehran will have to fend off ‘peace spoilers’ from hardliners within their own regimes, the biggest external spoiler will be Israel. An Israeli spoiling initiative can easily be predicted by its extensive efforts in the past few months to sabotage negotiations to recover the JCPOA. To pursue this objective, Israel will likely utilize its enhanced connections with Saudi allies Bahrain and the UAE, and its cordial relations with sectors of Saudi leadership. More aggressive Israeli actions similar to what has been used to try to subvert the JCPOA must be considered in the event that diplomatic scheming becomes unviable, such as clandestine strikes on Iranian facilities or interests in the Gulf. 

Given the United States’ strong interest in a Saudi-Iran détente, American foreign policy should be directed at facilitating this prospective rapprochement by using its leverage to fend off Israel as a potential ‘spoiler.’ This leverage primarily consists of diplomatic tools and levers that dictate Israel’s capability to act, oftentimes with impunity. The goal in this case should be for the US to divest Israel of its impunity given its dependence on US funds, weaponry, and diplomatic support. The magnitude of a prospective Saudi-Iran détente behooves the US to take a proactive, buttressing role, even if it requires austerity measures to limit Israeli bellicosity. 

The implications of this half-century long rivalry in the Persian Gulf have been immeasurably dire for the stability and wellbeing of people in the Middle East. A détente is not only in the interest of regional peoples and states, but also for the benefit of the world given the interregional effects of war and extremism emanating from the Middle East. While optimism is seldom rewarded in the Middle East, with facilitation from the US and members of the international community, Tehran and Riyadh may be able to agree on an incremental, bottom-up confidence-building process that could signify a new era of peace and security in the region.