Shall we play a game?

No, this is not a 1980s film about Matthew Broderick staving off nuclear disaster, but another age-old game that we have been playing since humanity existed: war. As with the board game with the same name, war involves risks, either taking them or accepting them based on the cards you are dealt. Unlike the board game, however, the fog of war clouds the capabilities of the enemy, and leaders risk either diving headfirst into a body of cool water, or solid concrete. Either way, war is a calculated risk, and oftentimes there are no restraints to the risks taken by some of history's most notorious political figures. From Adolf Hitler to Vladimir Putin, these leaders created a system of repression and fear that resulted in fear mongering, to the point that “bad news” was almost universally understood to be unacceptable. In every case, there is a lack of information regarding the scope and size of the enemy, resulting in the ultimate collapse of the authoritarian state. The game has been in play since the dawn of time, and now it is time to see if the dictators of the modern era have been blinded by the systems they have created.

Adolf Hitler: The German Führer That was Crushed By the Soviet Bear

The one lesson history has taught anyone is to never invade Russia during the Winter. This lesson was doomed to be learned once more when Adolf Hitler chose to invade the Soviet Union during World War II. Hitler believed that his military could envelop much of the Soviet Union before winter struck by the end of 1941. Greatly overestimating the capabilities of his army and assuming that the Soviets would fold as quickly as the French had, he opened a two-front war under the mistaken belief that he could force victory and become unstoppable, with the resources of the Soviet territories funding the Nazi war machine. But—spoiler alert—even with a six-million man army, thousands of tanks, and air superiority, the dictator failed to achieve his objectives. 

Logistics were not on Hitler’s side. The Wehrmacht did not have the production capability to keep armies supplied with trucks and tanks on two fronts; 75-80% of the army utilized horse-drawn propulsion. The Allies, however, had the capability to produce hundreds of thousands of mechanized vehicles and deliver them to their Soviet counterparts. Additionally, the German military severely underestimated their enemies, basing their war strategy on older information which falsely described the actual size of the Soviet Army. Acting on this information, the High Command developed a strategy based on German victories in World War I and the quick victories in France and Scandinavia. Hitler, giddy with victory, believed that his armies could kick down the door and the entire “rotten structure” of communism could be eradicated in one fell swoop. 

The Nazi war machine had the capacity to achieve victory, but the nature of the regime and the inability to resist what the leader wanted squashed any dissent within the German High Command. Hitler had an image of himself and of his state that was simply over-exaggerated. Nobody questioned his decrees, nobody questioned his flawed logic, and everyone believed what he preached. There was no room for failure in his government, and anyone who did not carry out his will was simply removed from power. Lower-ranking generals could not deviate from strategy, and the rigid structure of High Command led many lower-ranking officers to falter their advantages early in the conflict. Hitler himself micromanaged the campaign, diverting troops away from key military objectives, denying generals more resources, and causing one of the largest defeats in military history. As the military failed to reach their objectives, Hitler began hearing “no” for the first time, and started outright sacking his most competent generals. 

 While it might be considered in hindsight that Hitler should not have invaded the Soviet Union, at the time he knew the stakes. The German economy was not prepared for a long term conflict, and had not fully mobilized until the loss at Stalingrad in 1942. Hitler knew that Germany did not have the resources to sustain a protracted war with the Western imperial powers. Believing he could achieve an easy victory in the East, he made a logical gamble with the information he had; but the complete control of the narrative and the inability to negate what the leader wanted ultimately caused the failure that was the Eastern front. His inability to acknowledge the logistical capacity of his military and the advice from his generals cost Hitler his war.  

Gamal Abdel Nasser: Trusting the Soviet Snake

The visionary of Pan-Arabism,  Gamal Abdel Nasser was an icon for Egyptians and the Arab World. Under his leadership, the Egyptians removed the puppet British monarchy, nationalized the Suez Canal, and modernized Egypt. The new socialist regime Nasser created was revolutionary, and was one of the first Arab nations that removed Western influence from its internal politics. Nasser’s regime was built on the idea of anti-Westernism, and many of his internal and external policies reflected the idea. His inner circle of advisors and confidants relied on their anti-Western slogans to maintain their grip onto power, as Egypt was not an economic powerhouse. As a result, Nasser’s regime became tied to its positioning on the global stage. Nasser was a new player to the Cold War game, and he was already flirting with both camps in an attempt to benefit Egypt. At first, he courted the Eisenhower administration, but once the Americans threatened to pull out their investments into the Aswan High Dam in the south of Egypt, Nasser shifted to the Soviets. The Soviets built the dam, funded his military, and trained them to protect against any attacks by Israel. The Arab states had constantly been in a state of quasi-war with Israel following their defeat in 1948, and had been adamant at getting their revenge, and Nasser believed that his modernized army with Soviet support could overwhelm Israeli defenses and achieve victory. Nasser also had Arab allies in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, which could wield a near 2-1 ratioed army against Israel. The Arab states could muster 900 planes, 5,000 tanks, and half a million men, compared to 175 planes, 1,000 tanks, and 75,000 troops. By numbers alone, Nasser and his coalition had enough to curb-stomp the Israelis into submission, but the war ended in a total wipeout for the Arab forces and a humiliating defeat for Nasser. The question is, why did Goliath lose to David?

The answer lies in a revolutionary field at the time: intelligence. Nasserist Egypt relied extensively on Soviet intelligence reports on Israeli military concentrations, and the Soviets heavily exaggerated the danger of the Israeli military towards the Arab alliance. The Israeli threat was not true at the time, and in fact the Israelis were preparing a defensive conflict against the Arabs, and the troop concentrations against Syria were exaggerated to promote Soviet influence in the region. Their intelligence network pierced into the heart of the Arab armies, and they knew exactly where the troops were, where the Arab air forces were located, and when the Arabs would strike. 

This does not mean that the Soviets were all to blame for the failure of 1967; Nasser simply had the wrong information, and acted on it. Nasser may have known that the information was false, but he acted as if he believed the information to be true. There was an over-escalation on Nasser’s part, where he assumed that his actions in the Sinai and Tiran would pressure Israel to back down. The problem then lies with how Israel perceived Nasser, and believed that an attack was coming when in reality he was bluffing. Even so, Nasser’s numerical superiority indulged his ego, so much that he became overconfident in his abilities to win any potential conflict with Israel. He had a false image of an Arab alliance that would act like a pincer and slice Israel in two, and that his armies were competent enough to defeat whatever the Israelis could muster. In fact, he had the numbers and advanced Soviet weaponry to do so, but it all comes down to information. Nasser was intelligent enough to know that Egypt could not launch the first strike for fear of losing moral support, and he believed from his own intelligence that Israel could not launch such a strike. He knew that he needed to engage in a conflict, as his regime was built upon his victory against the West and Israel in 1956. The choice to act on flawed Soviet intelligence was not of want, but of need. Nasser and his government knew that there needed to be a war, and believed that they were calling the shots. In reality, Nasser’s reactionary choices to these reports were due to his own psychology. Jean LaCouture, a Nasser biographer, explains how “ He was unable to foresee the opponent's reactions to his own moves, and succumbed to wishful thinking, not the least because he 'allowed himself to be seduced by the gobbledygook dispensed by his own radio.” The nature of the autocratic regime lends itself to produce egotistical rulers who fail to see the world for what it really is, leading to overestimation and ultimate breakdown when failure occurs. The system he built around himself as the leader of the Pan-Arab movement placed a burden on the regime that he could not have realistically sustained, and his nation became a geopolitical pawn that forced his hand into a conflict that he was not prepared to fight, resulting in the end of Pan-Arabism. As with Adolf Hitler, he became obsessed with a dream and believed the lies he was spewing, and faced the consequences.

Saddam Hussein: The Egotistical Iraqi who brought a knife to a gunfight

Saddam Hussein is a prime example of how authoritarian systems can lead to the failure of military conflicts, because of the realistic capabilities of the Iraqi military versus the image inside Saddam’s head. Saddam had failed in two conflicts, and in both situations he attempted to justify his actions and stabilize his regime. Prior to the Iran-Iraq War in 1981, Saddam needed a distraction away from the civil unrest within the Kurdish North, and the situation presented itself to attack a supposed weak neighbor that had just gone through a revolution. His logic was sound, that leaders typically strike adversaries when they are going through internal strife, just as Hitler had done with the Soviet Union during Stalin’s military purges. The failures of the conflict lie within the system Saddam built around himself, which was one of failing to comprehend and react to the risks associated with the conflict itself. He believed that the conflict would be opportunistic, meeting all the strategic goals within a short period of time, including the elimination of Iranian influence within Iraq, and the potential for geopolitical expansion into the Iranian region of Khuzestan, with a significant Arab minority. The bigger picture, however, was that Saddam was attempting to fulfill his dream of defeating Israel and the West by knocking Iran out of the picture, almost like a rehearsal for an invasion against Israel. The regime needed an enemy that they could tackle, and easily achieve victory, and therefore Iran was perceived to be the training ground necessary to achieve these future goals. However, Saddam was placing the cart before the horse, as the Iraqi military was not prepared for a prolonged conflict, and did not have the manpower for such a crusade. The invasion galvanized the Persian population, and the conflict quickly turned into a stalemate that almost led to the collapse of his regime. Saddam kept the war going for eight years, with neither side yielding, and in the end nothing changed, and Iraq lost between 500,000 to 1,000,000 citizens and soldiers combined. The failures of this conflict blinded Saddam to the point that he needed a win, something to maintain his popularity and maintain his image as the Arab strongman in the region. And with that, enter Kuwait.

Saddam, largely due to the failures of the Iran War, became increasingly paranoid and began to micromanage military decisions. Saddam had a million man army at his disposal that he could not demobilize, due to the fear that these armed men could revolt and remove him from power. Feeding into his own paranoia, he made a deal with the devil (at least he thought), and invaded Kuwait in 1990. The primary justification was that Iraq wanted to absolve itself of its debt to Kuwait, and that Kuwait was threatening the Iraqi hydrocarbon industry by slanted fracking and the contortion of oil prices. Saddam believed that the West would not intervene, and that the United States had given him the guarantee that they would not intervene, and that his Arab neighbors would simply not care. In an exclusive interview, UC Davis Political Science Lecuter McCage Griffiths explains that Saddam miscalculated American-Saudi coordination, and failed to account for a defense of Iraq entirely. He refused to listen to his subordinates, and military commanders often had to resort to implicit interpretations of his commands during the conflict. He had grand illusions, and based on the words of Stephen Hosmer, an RAND analyst, Saddam had “congenital optimism, excessive self-confidence, and poor understanding of international and military affairs.” Saddam believed that America would not want to intervene in another foreign conflict because of its failures in Vietnam, and that the US military could operate in the Iraqi desert. He believed that the Iraqi military would crush any foreign invaders, and that the Iraqi people would fight tooth and nail for their homeland. Oh, how wrong was he.

Saddam made the same mistakes as Nasser and Hitler. The normal response, in hindsight, would be to wonder why he did not learn the mistakes of his predecessors. Authoritarians need to distract their populations away from their oppression and towards a common enemy, and Saddam took that gamble. There are plenty of ways Saddam miscalculated American involvement in the Gulf War, and could have easily taken steps to prevent such a humiliating loss. The issue, however, lies within the structure of the regime itself. It is logical to assume that someone in the Iraqi High Command knew that this might happen, that the building up of American forces near the Saudi-Iraqi border was a sign that intervention was coming, but nothing was done to prevent it. American military analysts themselves state that an Iraqi push into Northeastern Saudi Arabia would have crushed the coalition's hopes of beating back Iraqi forces, and a ceasefire would have been reached. The reason this did not happen was the daydreaming dictator failed to seize the initiative. He was living in his own world with his own ideas, and nobody could say otherwise, or face the gallows. His failure was self-fulfilling, and in the end he died believing his own lies.

Vladimir Putin: The Blind Tyrant of Moscow

Andy: Excuse my language, but if the Russian military is shit, is it not worth it to tell your leader that ‘we cannot wage this war [Ukraine] like this?’

McCage: Yeah, it could be, only if you [Russian intelligence] believe that that decision won't get you thrown off the top of an apartment building.

This is the perfect summation of the worst military disaster since the Vietnam War. Notwithstanding, the war in Ukraine was a gamble by Russian dictator Vladimir Putin to maintain his grip on power, and it has quite literally blown up in his face. The Russians had total supremacy, with modern technology, numerical superiority, and nuclear power. All the cards were aligned, and Russia was expected to conquer Kyiv within 72 hours of the invasion. But the Ukrainians pushed back, the military failed to achieve any of their goals and has garnered exorbitant losses, and the economy has tanked due to crippling Western sanctions. From the second ranked military, it was a shock on all sides to see the failures seen in this war, and Putin is now pushed into a corner he cannot escape. The reasons for this failure stem from the disincentivization of telling bad news, corruption, and the pressure to act.

The system built by Vladimir Putin was similar to the rest, except that it kept the corruption present from the days of the Soviet Union. High-ranking officials were placed in their position because they had connections, not because of their merits. For goodness’s sake, the current Minister of Defense is a civilian with no formal military experience, and has been in charge of the Russian Armed forces since 2012, and is still in charge of military operations in Ukraine! While there are also systemic issues within the Russian military, the only facts that remain for sure are that Putin miscalculated how a war with Ukraine would progress, and the system prevented any pushback against his agenda. Lucian Kim, analyst of the Kenan Institute, describes this sentiment, stating that…

“There is plenty of evidence that Putin convinced himself that the Russian forces would swiftly decapitate the Ukrainian government and install a puppet regime. The reasons why he could have been convinced of this farce is either: Russia’s intelligence services are so incompetent that they totally underestimated Ukrainians’ fighting spirit; or Putin’s generals knew the true situation on the ground but were too scared to tell him.”

Clearly, the latter seems to be the case, because as Professor Griffiths mentions, humans naturally dislike those that disagree with them, so to ensure job preservation, people lie. It is easier to dupe the dictator and convince them of a lie than to wager your life with the truth. Putin believed Ukraine would fall just as Crimea had in 2014, and that the Russian military would conquer the entire country like a cakewalk. He failed to consider that the Russian Navy operated with technology from the 80s, the Air Force was dependent on the importation Western microchips, and that Russian mechanized forces were prone to malfunction and breakdowns. To pile onto this barrage of failure, Putin, as every dictator on this list has done, took over strategic decision making when casualties were mounting. Russian military structure is also extremely rigid, and orders from General Putin had to be executed or face severe retribution, whereas the Ukrainians take creative liberty in fighting the occupiers, defeating the Russians at every turn. 

Every leader had a flaw that Putin could have foreseen, and acted in such a way that would lead him to victory. Ironically enough, he made every mistake in the book. He consistently micromanages the Ukraine conflict, gets lost in his own propaganda machine, and is so paranoid of failure that he believes the war was bound to happen. Putin had the advice from all the aforementioned dictators to plan a successful war, and ensure complete and total victory. But once again, history rhymes, and he has failed miserably. Putin has his own vision of how the 21st century is, and calculated that the West was disjointed, that the Ukrainians would welcome the Russians with open arms, and that the Russian military had the capability to take on the entirety of NATO. But this time, he had the advantages that none of these dictators had: a decently armed military, nuclear weapons, and a robust intelligence community. And yet, he did fail! Why? Because everyone was terrified for their lives. Anyone who did not commit to Putin’s fantasy was removed from power, and everyone who did got preferential treatment. Nobody wanted to tell him the truth, so they fed him pieces of the truth and one large lie. Regardless if Putin knew the truth or not, he was compelled to act. Putin is a smart man, and learned that the Russian people loved his foreign policy wins, and he saw a boost in approval when he invaded Crimea. When COVID-19 struck, his approval collapsed to all-time lows, and he needed a boost to his approval to maintain his legitimacy. Regardless of the status of his armed forces, he needed to declare war to get a “win”, and he had an opportunity in Ukraine, as Saddam did in Kuwait. He looked at the information he had, and made a rational decision, which on paper would be a complete success. As it turns out, his grand success became a complete failure, with losses in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson. Putin deemed it necessary to start this war, and all of his cards are on the table. He cannot afford a loss, and his internal legitimacy depends on a victory, or a continuation of the conflict. He has to stay in the war, regardless of consequence, or be forced to face a loss of power not seen since the failure of the USSR in Afghanistan.

Why Dictators Can’t Win

If it was not too hard to notice, each of these dictators had one thing in common: Misconceptions. Each of these dictators had a…unique… way of seeing the world, almost on the level of rainbows and unicorns. As smart as they are, they did not build their beliefs on reality but on their own narcissistic beliefs, that they are gods of this world. The cult of personality built around a dictator extends to the dictator himself, and he starts to believe the lies he spews. Any person with sole authority dislikes hearing bad news, but your office manager won't shoot you if you fail to deliver your quarterly report on time, but Mr. Putin would. As Professor Griffiths says, the job of dictator is the easiest job on Earth when times are good, but when times take a turn for the worse, it's quite the opposite. The same concept goes for everyone underneath them, the military cannot fail if there is no war, and intelligence need not be relevant unless there is an enemy to fight. The problem with the system is that authoritarians need war, they need a way to distract the population from their faltering domestic policy, whether it be a failing economy or internal repression. The populace needs an enemy that is not the regime itself, and by delivering an enemy, the people rally behind the government, leading to increased legitimacy and greater approval. The problem with that, is that wars of necessity always lead to failure.

Democratic governments also go to war, but more often than not they succeed until it is unpopular to do so. The United States, based on military opinion alone, would have remained in Vietnam or Afghanistan had it not been for the power of public opinion. Other democracies waged war with their public on their side, as is reflective with French opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 due to public resentment, and the UN intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Autocracies do not have to rely on public opinion, and craft narratives necessary to convince their people why the war is necessary, regardless of how absurd their justifications are. Their system of rule prevents cohesive victory, because there is no true incentive to win for the glory of the nation. That is the job of the dictator, but everyone else wants to survive, and last long enough to work for the next guy in charge. There is no accountability, only what the dictator wants to hear. 

As a result, misinformation spreads across the entire system, working its way up the system. It starts down from the lowly intelligence officer to the dictator like a vine, strangling the system until it pops from the top like a soda can. Dictators take the information they get, and choose whether or not to believe it. They then act on this information, and change the fate of millions

Imagine a road with a fork, with one direction  leading to a cliff with razor sharp rocks at the bottom, and the other to eternal glory and power. Hitler, Kim, Nasser, Saddam and Putin are all in line, ready to take their chances. But they are blindfolded, and have a choice to guide themselves or ask for assistance. The first four begin their walk, and have taken a path that has led to their subsequent demise. The last man, Vladimir Putin, is still walking, and on the edge of the cliff. He can hear the waves crash underneath, but is trying to convince himself that eternal glory lies beyond. He can still turn around, but one can only imagine what happens to Mr. Putin in the near future. The game will continue, and new players will emerge and fall into the same mistakes as their predecessors, and they will ultimately fall into the same cyclical march all dictatorships are doomed to repeat.

Interview with McCage Griffiths found below:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Hq-IlSdS-3cLvyIhjPUTc1wXisZy9IpI/view?usp=share_link

Special Thanks to McCage Griffiths for the amazing interview! This article could not have been done without your input and commentary!

Another Special Thanks to Donia Ghaith for the truly inspirational graphics! The article would not have come together without your visual flare!

Edited by : Ryleigh “RJ” Praker