As the Islamic State Central Africa Province surges through Africa at an unprecedented pace, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also escalated its campaign in the Middle East since the start of the new year. January 21, 2021 in Baghdad, Iraq, marked the beginning of this new terrorist offensive in which twin suicide bombings killed 32 people and wounded dozens. Although it is only the beginning of April, ISIS has committed acts of terror virtually every day of the new year in the form of kidnappings, assassinations, and intimidation to reassert its territorial dominance. ISIS claims responsibility for daily operations in northern and eastern Syria—most dramatically in its former stronghold in Deir ez-Zor governorate as well as in al-Hawl refugee camp in al-Hasakah governorate. The terror group has also increased its funding efforts by employing a common strategy of ‘kidnap and extort’ and is reactivating its long-standing smuggling routes through Turkey and Iraq. Taken together, the increased attack frequency and evidence of renewed funding initiatives constitute a growing ISIS presence in Syria that must be preempted with an urgency capable of impeding its renewed campaign of terror. 

In 2014, the United States formed an international coalition to rid Syria and Iraq of ISIS, titled “The Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS,” which realized success in 2018. This initiative relied on the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to navigate terrain and gain insights that are known only by locals. Founded in 2015, the SDF is an alliance of Kurdish and Arab militias backed by the U.S. and other Western powers, and has declared its mission to create a secular, democratic, and federalized Syria. Having experienced the horrors of life under ISIS and the persecution of innocent populations like the non-Islamic Kurdish Yazidis, who fled after being threatened with genocide, the SDF amplified its drive to eradicate the Islamic State. As former U.S. president Obama stated, the combined efforts of the SDF and the Global Coalition sought to “degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIS through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.” This included deploying airstrikes and ground support, interrupting ISIS funding and the flow of foreign fighters, and discrediting the group’s extremist ideology, while simultaneously delivering humanitarian assistance to those displaced by ISIS. Since the campaign “defeated” ISIS in 2018, former U.S. Presidents Obama and Trump decreased some 2,000 U.S. troops to about 500 in Syria, leaving the SDF responsible for preventing any future resurgence of ISIS. 

ISIS attacks in Iraq and Syria increased significantly in 2020 and have escalated in 2021, demonstrating the group’s capacity and resolve to retake territory, resources, and populations.  The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated this resurgence. The head of Norway’s forces in Iraq, Lt. Col. Stein Grongstad, claimed that ISIS has flourished while Syrian forces are seemingly “pacified” and less coordinated than before the virus preoccupied the world. This can be attributed to the weakness of Syria’s health system which was in shambles even before the war began. Though ISIS may be unable to mount sophisticated operations outside of Iraq and Syria, intelligence reports show that it is expanding its presence and increasing attacks in both countries. ISIS continues to press forward with online recruitment, with the group’s manpower currently standing at more than 10,000 fighters according to a recent U.N. estimate. 

As its presence grows, ISIS has steadily carried out assassinations, ambushes, and kidnappings in northeast Syria, and is responsible for the deaths of a number of regime and SDF soldiers. For instance, in 2021, attacks by ISIS cells and affiliated groups have sharply increased in the SDF-controlled al-Hawl refugee camp, which has emerged as ISIS’s ‘beating heart’ in Syria. Al-Hawl camp houses captured ISIS fighters and is positioned along the Syria-Iraq border in isolation, making the camp susceptible to the spread of radical Islamist ideology. The camp has become a collection point for more than 12,000 extremists (many of whom are women and children from ISIS families) and the number of murders in the camp has risen to 47 since the beginning of 2021: 15 in January, 14 in February, and 18 in March. This is more than triple the number of people killed in the same months of 2020, evolving the camp into what the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights describes as the “Al-Hawl mini-state.” To avoid repatriating their unwanted citizens who joined ISIS, many countries continue to ignore the terrorist breeding ground that the camp has become. The trend of increasing monthly attacks from January to March clearly demonstrates the SDF’s failure to keep ISIS in its crippled condition in northeastern Syria. As such, chaos and lack of security are worsening within al-Hawl refugee camp, turning it into a ticking bomb and fueling ISIS’s regrowth. 

ISIS remains well-funded and the beginning of 2021 has experienced an upswing in the group’s money-yielding tactics, suggesting more intense efforts to stockpile resources. On February 4, 2021, ISIS militants kidnapped and killed a Kurdish car dealer named Abbas Khader Juma and his business partner from the village of Tal Al-Taweel in the al-Hasakah countryside, which is located in the far northeast corner of Syria. The kidnappers then sent a video from the merchant’s phone to his wife on February 11, 2021, showing the horrifying execution of her husband. The video depicted the 25-year-old merchant kneeling and blindfolded in a barren desert area; the hidden militant then stated, “this man is of Kurdish origin, working for Self-Defense, and this is a message to all those who follow his example, this is your destiny.” The car dealer’s family received a new message from ISIS asking his relatives to transfer $100,000 to a Turkish bank account in return for handing over his body. The fate met by Khader Juma is like that of many and has become increasingly common given that ISIS often resorts to taking hostages for ransom to fund its insurgency. While only a fraction of its total income, the terror group accumulated approximately $50 million from 2014 to 2016 through kidnappings alone. The kidnap, kill, and extort strategy employed in this instance resembles the group’s strategies used during its infancy and suggests that the group is growing in resources and strength. By kidnapping, killing, then extorting, ISIS can accomplish three goals rather than one. Killing the hostage will (1) incite more fear and chaos in the ‘infidel’ population through its horrific symbolism, (2) carry out ISIS’s extremist doctrine of slaughtering unbelievers, and (3) yield funds for the group’s insurgency because the victim’s family will pay ransoms for his body. 

The story of Abbas Khader Juma demonstrates another development that further suggests an impending Islamic State resurgence: the increased usage of its long-standing smuggling routes. The terror group’s request for the $100,000 deposit to be transferred to a Turkish bank is worrisome and suggests that ISIS’s routes through Turkey are used for the transfer of capital. Turkey’s borders have always been porous, making it prone to smuggling and clandestine crossings that have been exploited by drug traffickers transporting heroin, cocaine, and other narcotics in the past. After the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011, these long-standing routes became supply channels for armed rebels, including the Islamic State who has continued to exploit them even after theirits ‘defeat’ in 2018. The Turkish government remains somewhat vigilant and is endeavoring to dismantle these routes by spearheading raids on suspected locations within ISIS’s network. Nevertheless, in 2021, ISIS seems to be using these channels with success and at a greater rate for stockpiling funds and weapons with its associates in Turkey. 

The money-yielding tactic of ‘kidnap then extort’ has other benefits for ISIS beyond simply money. On March 4, 2021, an armed group affiliated with ISIS cells in northeastern Syria kidnaped three brothers who were transporting barley from al-Hasakah to Deir ez-Zor. The young men were beaten and taken to an unknown destination by the kidnappers who contacted the young men’s relatives the following day and demanded that they pay them $5,000 or the three brothers would be beheaded. The relatives then transferred the $5,000, and the three brothers were set free a few hours later. Although the group did not declare why these men were targeted, ISIS likely intends to establish influence through fear by targeting farming communities and individuals transporting goods. ISIS is aware that, as it endeavors to reclaim territory, it will need to induce farmers and other producers to support ISIS’s finances. Given that a large proportion of ISIS financing during its peak came from the sale of crops and taxes from exploited farmers, it is likely that ISIS is now abducting farmers as a means of re-establishing power through fear—this serving as the preliminary building blocks for a broader money-yielding scheme.

The Islamic State’s increasing attack frequency and intensified funding initiatives coupled together constitute a growing ISIS presence in northeastern Syria. While it is unlikely to be a core issue for the task-laden Biden administration, the U.S. should endeavor to neutralize the remnants of ISIS before it grows into a full-blown terrorist insurrection and becomes a core issue. A comeback would not only jeopardize U.S. national security interests but also imperil over eight million Iraqis and Syrians only recently liberated from the group. U.S. policy must pivot away from a Middle East mission singularly focused on deterring Iran’s nuclear development in order to address this brewing issue.

The clearest action in making this pivot towards countering ISIS will be to target the group’s finances. Currently, ISIS seems to be stockpiling funds and weapons using associates based in neighboring Turkey. Although this illicit trade reactivation will likely strengthen the terror group, it demonstrates that the group also relies heavily on these trade channels into Turkey. By cutting off these routes, ISIS will likely face increased difficulties funding their insurgency and terror initiatives. Therefore, the U.S. and Turkey, in their efforts to eradicate ISIS, should coalesce and seek ways to interrupt these smuggling activities. This will effectively suffocate and isolate the group which should improve the efficacy of the SDF’s counterterrorism initiatives and military efforts by the U.S.

A light U.S.-coalition presence on the ground in both Syria and Iraq will be critical to stifle and reverse the Islamic State’s territorial expanse. To avoid committing an excessive amount of American troops in Syria, the current U.S. military deployment should work with local allies to stymy ISIS initiatives in specific “hot spots.” With al-Hawl refugee camp emerging as the group’s beating heart in Syria, it and other areas of concentrated violence and control should be the focus of U.S. military efforts. 

At the time of writing, a counterterrorism effort in al-Hawl camp has begun whereby Internal Security Forces and Counterterrorism Special Units, backed by International Coalition forces, have arrested 125 suspected ISIS members so far. Notably, Mohammed Abdulrahman Sherif Dabbakh, who served as the ISIS Emir of zakat in Al-Hawl, and Abu Mohammed Al-Jomaily, who served as a Sharia Emir (senior sharia commander) for ISIS, were arrested. This has raised new questions about how high-ranking ISIS commanders and officials entered al-Hawl camp undetected. It is highly likely that ISIS cells and leaders have been able to move freely due to widespread corruption of the camp’s guards, as many weapons and tunnels were found inside the camp. While the overall results of this campaign may encourage some optimism, ISIS attacks will likely persist if this counterterrorism campaign does not implement lasting changes within the camp that plug the security holes exploited by ISIS in the past. 

Generally, without a concerted effort to preempt this reemerging threat in 2021, ISIS is likely to capitalize on the pressing economic and public health challenges in Iraq and Syria and continue to expand until the U.S. and coalition partners are forced to address the problem, which will have worsened exponentially. It behooves the U.S. government to pursue a Middle East policy that includes a counter-ISIS mission, for quick and decisive actions to address the Islamic State’s resurgence are necessary to defend the interests of U.S. foreign policy and local populations.